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I. INTRODUCTION : This article is intended as a general treatment of what 
is loosely termed the frequenting provision , canvassing and commenting on 
possible alternatives to the present state of the law. S.52 (1) (j) of the 
Police Offences Act )9 27 enacts as follows 
(1) Every person shall be deemed a Rogue and Vagabond within the 
meaning of this Act and b e liable [to a fine not exceeding $400 
or] to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 1 year -
(j) who being a suspected person or reputed thief, frequents any 
port or harbour, river, canal, navigable stream , dock or basin 
or any quay or wharf, or any oth r public place , or in any 
house building or other plac adjacent to any such port or 
harbour, river , canal , navigable stream, dock or basjn, or 
quay or wharf with a felonious int nt. 1 
No attempt is made to delve with any d pth into th general case 
2 
law, but an effort is made to highlight ar as of uncertainty which have 
arisen. Hopefully , this will illustrate th broad and vague powers 
presently vested in the h nds of th police; lhe anomalies which have 
emerged from such powers , and the oppressiv• potential for abus which 
lurks in the hazy shadow cast by such pow rs . 
Wid and vague police powers h .. we long been censur d as harbouring 
a t.emptation to arbitrary and discriminnto y 3 nforccme nt. Nobody cxpr sscs 
this more clearly than the United Kingdom Roy.-:il Commission on Police 
Powers; "Where Lhe laws are vague the danger of the police strainjng the 
4 
evidence tu a<.;hieve a conviction is grea est." 
The main thrust of this paper is to xamine whether the frequ n ing 
provision as it stands is needed, and wha viabl alt.crnatives ar available 
if it is found not to be . This enquiry shall take place within the frame-
work of lhe two mod ls of the criminal process formulatr~d by llerb r L. Pack r 
5 in "'l'lw Limits of the Criminal Sanction. " 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
The case law in England and Australia limi s this offcnc0 o persons 
suspect,d of property crimes or crim•s of dishones ty. How•v•r, since 
R v. Wilson (1962) NZLR 979 the N w Zealand provision has been extended 
to cover suspected sex offend •rs as w 11. 
For a general coverage of the cas law see ; 
(1) G.P . Curry "Vagrancy " Victoria University of Welling on 
LLM Thesis 1971 pp 52-4 , 59 , 61-6?. , 74, 116-121 
(ii) Pike " Is there a Defenc . to S . 52 (l) ( j)? " NZUL Rev . 1975 
(6) p 315-340. 
curry note 2 supra p . 37. Y amans Cons ti ·utional A· dCks on Vagrancy 
Laws 20 Stanford L.R. ) 1968) 782 pp 7 2-793 . I3udnitz Vagrancy Laws 
Invalid as too v ague and as improper Exercise of Police Power (1968) 
3 Har. Civ . Rights - Civ.Lib.Law Rev . 439 pp 441-442. Corranents of 
Luxford S . M. in F 11 v. Caun le~ (1949) 6 M. C . D. 48 at p . 50 . 
Curry Note 2 supra p . 147 Royal Commis ,ion on Police Powers (UK 1929) 
cmnd 3297 . " 
H. L . Packc>r "The Limits of he Criminal Sanction " 
1 
~~~~
1
ford Stanfo;d 'tJlf1~~~ 
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Note that these models are not intended to represent a complete or 
self-contained description of reality , or represent the ideal to the exclusion 
of the other . They are an attempt to abstract two seperate value systems t hat 
compete for priority in the operation of the criminal process . They afford a 
conven ient way to t alk about the operation of the criminal process , whose d a y -
to-day func t ioning involves a constant series of minut adjustments between 
the competing d emands of the two values and a series of resolutions of the 
tensions between t heir competing claims . 
On one side of the fence can be seen the Due Process Model, which 
champions the individual ' s right to freedom and liberty - the right to be left 
alone . 
On the other side of the fence can be seen what has been labelled Th 
• Crime Control Model , which lays great stress on the contemporary ne d and use-
fulness of police powers such as S . 52 (1 ) (j) as crime prevention devices . 
Crime pr vention is seen as all-important - by protecting soci Ly from crim 
before it occurs , the community ' s liberty is maximised. The slight encroach-
ment on an innoc nt person ' s frcedom, whi.ch involv,s mere embarrassm nt or loss 
of di9nity/ is justifiable and should be sacrific d if soci _ ·y is to r ap th 
long term benefits of crime prevention. 
The next stage of the tlrticl nt ils a brief consideration of th 
role of the policy, in particular whdt sort of prev ntiv rol should thy 
perform? How far can the police p0w~rs be pruned , if thy ;,re t.o remain 
effective agents of social control and abl to carry out the polic mand<tc . 
The New z aland polic claim Li1e fr uenting rovision is nee ssary , 
and their preventive rol would bes V'rely impaired if S.52 (1) (J)was 
wiped from the books . This claim will be exilffiined to s if it is true in 
substance , and the question will be posed , wheth r th police do , in fact , 
need the fr quenting provision. 
To conclude , the proposed reforms and alterna ivcs to S . 52 (1) (j) 
shall be outlined and d alt with. Som o her form of soci<l control to that 
offer d by the fr quenting provision is call d for - his 1,aper concludes wi~h 
a proposal whicl1 hopefully , best answe s the cri icisms 1 vclled at the 
frequcn ing provi ·ion and also conforms to h crit ria propounded by Packer 
as to what kinds of conduct the legisla ure should "pr,'scribe " a criminal 
sanction for . 
Two concepts which ar at th core of this arl icl n•quire further 
cxplana ion , to give some indica ion as to he manner in which th writer has 
interpr ted them in th • contex of the article. 
• 
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Firstly the term abuse . It is almost impossibl to give a satisfactory 
definition of abuse - note however these instances which throw some light on 
what the writer regards as an abuse; 
( i ) Where the suspect has not done anything to show the intention to 
commit a particular offence - but S . 52(1) (j)serves as a " short-cut" out of 
"mere convenience " to circumvent the more rigorous demands required for the 
law of attempts . Mere suspicion is the foundation of the charge . 
( ii ) When t he frequenting charge is used to s upplement the present 
laws o f arrest wh i ch convey n o power to arrest on suspicion . The provision 
is employed in an u nderhand manner in practice as a "holding device", 
enabling the police to pursue further investigations into past or pr s nt 
offences . 
(iii ) The police may feel that the substantive charge against an accused 
might not hol d up to the scrutiny of the court . - so " frequenting" is 
tagged mas analternative charge . If the first charge does subsequently fail 
the police may rest asy that the second charge based on m r suspicion will 
probably be easier to "make stick". Where th police themselves feel strongly 
that a person who is guilty may be let off by the weakn ss of their own case 
then they may feel justified in convicting him at least for something . 
- frequenting fits the bill as something to charge him with. 
( iv) The harrassment , i ther through at-res and 1.:cJ.k ing int_o custody or 
via th threat of possible legal sanctions 3.r also abu",s of th criminal 
process . The freedom of the individual is r strictcd by th police action -
and it is left to the polic to dcfin who is a potential offender or suspect:. 
As Thurman Arnold = t- a ·.:.es ; " ... conceal0d prac ices h ve f:, bad odour ." 
T rence Arnold has this to say about such pr ctice>s "This involves a manipul-
ation and contempt for the law which is not d sirable in a law enforc ment 
agency. " 
7 
If anything at all can be gleaned from his rcvi 'W of abuses it is 
tho there is no " l gitimate" or prop r use of S.52 (l) (j). One invariably 
ends up concluding that any ac ion under S.52 (1) (j) is abusive , since a 
power to arrest on mere suspicion is in i self abusive of the lawmaking 
proc ss. The use of S . 52 (1) (j) is inconsisten with th0 g neral principles 
of cd minal liability . One of h corners on s of the crimincJ.l law is tha 
the accused is in11occnt until prov n guilty . Th onus is on the pros cution 
to prove beyond reasonable doubt hat the accused commi d a particul r 
offence , and in doing so had the requisite mens rea or guilty mind~ 
6 . Thurman Arnold Symbols of Government (1938)p. 162 
7 . T r nee Arnold Arr s , Victoria University of W llington LLM Thesis 
)972 p . 197 
8. see Woolmington v . Director of Pub lie Prosecutions [] 935) /\ .c . 462 
• 
" 
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In the writer's opinon an arrest on the basis of what a suspect 
may do or is thought likely to do has no place in the criminal law. What a 
person is suspected of being likely to do and what he in fact does often 
probably would rotco:i.n::ideit would not be an exaggeration to say that every 
person would have suppressed a temptation to conunit a crime, be it large or 
small, at some stage of their life. Every person should have the right to be 
left alone and to have an opportunity to suppress an urge to conunit a crime. 
And it does not matter one bit that the avenue by which this destination is 
reached is through second thoughts sparked by one's moral conscience or simply 
I 
being deterred by the risk of getting caught. In its simplest form the 
argument to this - if a person hasn't done anything , as a consequence nobody 
is harmed, therefore nobody should be punished. 
Crime prevention is the second concept in need of elaboration. In its 
simplest form crime prevention is the stopping of crime before it occurs. 
Prevention is a goal which speaks to the futur and can be effected by a 
variety of modes; Through the psychological deterrence of -
(a) perceiving the application of legal sanctions to offend rs 
for past conduct conunitted, OR 
(b) the threat or warning of the application of a legal sanction . 
Secondly, there is direct physical restraint, where an offender is arrested 
subsequently ircarcirrated and thus incapacitated from committing further 
offences while in custody. 
Another method, not directly r lated to this paper is the use of 
crimep:-evention devices such as locks or burglar alrms. An arresL on S.52 
(1) (j),harassment or the threat of applying S . 52 (~) (j) ar regarded by the police 
as ''legitimate'' and essential crime preventive measures. These, however, 
as noted, constitute abuses, they do not get past the fundamental criticism 
that they are based on mere suspicion and arc an unjustifiable interference 
with the individual's freedom. 
II. The Case Law - Uncertainty Reigns. 
S.52 (1) (j) can be broken down into three elements: 
1. suspected person or reputed thief 
2. frequenting 
3. with a felonious intent. 
A. Suspected person or reputed thi f 
(a) Evidence . To establish a person as a reput d thief or suspected 
person character evidence of a general nature is mad admissible, and previous 
convictions are included as admissible evidence . This permits the prosecution 
to present evidence not usually admissible in criminal prosecutions.
9 
Generally 
9. Curry note 2 supra pp 52-53 and cases cited therein. 
• 
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character evidence is inadmissible to show that the accused is likely to have 
committed the offence charged, and previous convictions are usually not 
admitted if all they go to show is a predisposition to crime.JO Evidence of 
other misconduct such as previous convictions is generally rejected because 
of the fear that it will be disproportionately prejudicial to the accused -
with the result the court will not pay enough attention to the weight of the 
11 evidence connecting him with the present offence charged. Plainly 
prejudice is unavoidable when the person is arraigned in the dock before the 
court. The accused may well be convicted on the present charge largely 
because of what it is proved he has done in the past . 
(b) Nature of the reputation. The definition of a "r puted thief" 
has a very broad meaning. As McCarthy J . said in Waterman v. Police [l968] 
NZLR 689, "Persons may be r puted thieves although they have never been 
convicted. A reputation is established if several in the community believ 
a person to be a thief or if the police believe that." A suspected 
person by the same token does not have to be a person known to th . police 
or one with a criminal record. According to Hutchinson J. in Illich Newson 
and Tonge [1958 ] NZLR 670 the question is one of reputation . The accused must 
clearly be a suspec t ed person at the time of his arrest. It. is prim facie 
evidence of that if he is a suspect d person in th eyes of those who know 
him. The facts on which such persons formed t.h i:r view n cd not be known t:.o 
the arresting officer at the time of the arres . In o her words jt is 
sufficient to render a perc::::on ~ " suspected person " if som other person 
suspects that he conunits crimes when he gels the chanc , and som•how the 
police get tn knry~ ~his . 
( c) Nature of reputation amongst th Pol ice• . The required nature of 
the reputation among the police is plagued by uncer aint.y . In O ' Connor v. 
Johnson () 903 ) 23 NZLR 183 Williams J . at p. )84 stat d; "The evidence of a 
police officer as to wh ether am n is reput d to be a member of a criminal 
class, and if so , what branch of that class seems to me to be the bes 
evidence of the man's reputation. Gen ral repu ation can be stablished by 
the evidence of one witness." Contrast this howev r , wit.h O ' Connor v. Hammond 
(1902 ) 21 NZLR 573 and Waterman v. Police [1968) NZLR 689 , which both 
speak of the police as a collectiv, the former referring to " their knowledge " 
while lcCarthy J . referred at p. 690 of the latter to th<' rcputc tion existing 
in police circles . Curry is of the opinion tha th · belief of one policeman 
10. For a discussion of the admissibilL y of character evidenc.: see ; 
Cross : Cross on Evidence 2nd NZ ed. 1971 , pp 363-370 
Adams : Crimin 1 Law and Practice in w Zealand 1971, pp 973-976 
11. see similar connnen s Criminal Law R vision Committee 11th Report , 
Evidence General 1972 p . 9. 
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would suffice to establish a reputation of being a thief. The vague nature of 
the reputation amongst the police is bad enough - but the dangers inherent 
in allowing a single sentence from one police officer to establish a person's 
reputation is a position too easily abused. 
(d) Reasonableness of Police belief. In Stevens v. Andrews (1909 ) 28 
NZLR 773 Chapman J. considered that reputation amongst the police would suffice 
only; " ... if it were shown that the repute was well-founded." Unfortunately 
wel l-founded was not further elaborated, so the possible safeguard was left 
hanging. In all probability, if a policeman's b lief as to the reputation 
of the accused was in issue before the court,the court would insist on a 
reasonableness standard. One would suspect however, that in the run of the 
mill case, the policeman's evidence would be pr sumed to be " fair play" 
and as the best evidence of a person ' s reputation , othcrwjse the case would 
not be brought to court. 
(e ) Reputation must be antecedent. Case law has established the 
limitation that the r putation must be established by conduct ant c dent to 
12 
the conduct that was the immediate cause of arrest . However, if a repute 
is challenged,previous convictions are admissible
13 
even wher they 
were unk11own to the arresting offic r
13 
Chapman J. in Illich ' s c se 
went even further and admitted general evidence of r putation no known to 
the arresting offic•r at the tim • of the ar~est. This is clearly irr concil-
iable with the limitation not d previously. Relianc on evid'nce unknown o 
the arresting officer to establish r"pute means th tan arr st for "frequ nting" 
can be "validated" by subsequently discovered inform tion. 
(f) Fcund offending unde~ S . 60 . Section 60 of the Po1i~~ 0 fences 
Act )927 confers the power of arrest in th police and stipulates that the 
accused must be "found offending". S . 60 is an absolute arrest provosion 
, and overrides S. 315 ( 2) (b) of the Crimes Act 19 l by vir ue of S . 315 ( 3) of 
the same Act. What all this means then is that there is no defence o an 
actLon for false arrest, e . g . that the person arresting had reasonable and 
hon st grounds to suspect th t the arr sted person was off nding . Both Curry 
and Arnold concur that there is " no reasonable cause to believe " def •nee to 
a police officer if the accused wasn ' in fact ' found off ndinq " • .
15 
The 
anom ly which surfaces here is that a police officer could validate a fals 
arrest (where the accused wasn't in fact found-offending) by using 
subsequently discovered information o establish that he was in fact "offending " 
when arrested . 
12. Curry note 2 supra p . 62 see cases cit d therein . 
13 . Curry note 2 supra p.61 see cases cited therein. 
14 . Curry note 2 supra p . Gl see cases cited herein . 
15. Curry note 2 supra pp . 190-192 
Arnold note 7 supra pp 75-77. 
.. 
• 
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(g) Acts antecedent rule . Where a person has become suspected purely 
as a result of his actions, those acts must be antecedent and distinct from 
16 
the act which caused him to be arrested and formed the basis of the charge. 
There have not emerged from the case law concret guidelines to determine 
what is a sufficient time lapse seperating the act giving rise to the 
suspicion and the act leading to arrest . It appears then to be a question 
of fact peculiar to the circumstances of each case - although this approach 
17 
has produced some varying results to say the least . 
B Frequenting 
( a) In Goundry v. Police [1954) NZLR 692 Norlh J. held that to 
frequen t a place a person need be there only once . He approved Airton v. Scott 
190 L . T . 393 and R. v. Child [1935) NZLR 28 which concluded that a person was 
frequenting as long as h e remained in a place long enough to effect his 
purpose . The Privy Council did not agr e , howev r, and in R. v. Nakhla 
[1975) 1 NZLR 393 [1976) A.C. 1. Lord Morris stated at p. 401; "So far as 
the principle on which cases turn can be crystallised in a singl expression 
it seems difficult to improve on the words of Lord Hewart C.J. in Rawlings v. 
Smith[l938] 1 K. B . 675 at 686 where he said "Fr quenting involv d; t..he nolion 
of something which to some degree , at any rate is continuous or rcreat d. " 
This approach was recently adopted by the New Zealand Court of Ap cal in 
Police v. Bazley [1976) 2 NZLR p.132 at p.158, adding tha frcquenLjng mus · 
depend on the circumstances of each particular case . 
(b ) Loit ring. Sine R. v . Child [1 35 1 NZLR 18G , " loit . ring " about. 
a locality has b een sufficient to conslitute "fr ,qucnting". Her ag jn 
un c rtainty exists as to how long is requir 0 cl Lo constitule "fr quenting " 
but as an example in Police v. Hartneady (1952 ) 7 M. C .D. S90, 25 minutes w s 
held s ufficient. 
C Felonius Intent and S . 81 
( a ) S.81 of the Police Offences Act 1927 enabl s the police to 
impute an intent to commit a crime from both he circums ances of t..:he case 
and the known character of the accused . S.81 provid s " ... in provjng a 
criminal intent it shall no be necessary to show tha ci1 person suspect .a 
was guilty of any particular act or acts tending to show his purpose or inten , 
and he may be convicted , if from the circumstances of th case and from his 
known character ... it appears to such Justices or Cour 
to commit a crime ." 
ha his intent was 
Them ans of est.ablishing known charac rare vague and pr judicial 
to he accused - as the case analysis refl cts . I is in a sense a double 
injustic, hat.: th known charact r thus established , along with tlw circum-
16 . Curry note 2 supra p. 116 see cased ci cd herein 
17. see Hartley v . Ellnor (1917 ) 117 L.T . 304 and compar it with he decision 
in Ex Parte King re Blackley (1938 ) S . R. N.S.W. 483. 
I 
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stances of the case , then allows the prosecutor to infer an intention to 
commit a crime. Once S . 81 comes into operation it seems a presumption of 
guilt is given a statutory blessing to go ahead. The crux of the matter 
would seem that all that is proved b yond reasonable doubt was that the 
police suspected the accused was likely to commit a crime. Who can ever 
be sure he would have? 
(b) Another departure from standard practic is that under S.81 
the police do not have to stipulate a particular crime , but can infer the 
intent to commit any crime. McCarthy P. in R . v. Wilson [1962] NZLR 979 at 
985 however stated that there must be a relationship between the known 
character and the particular kind of crime which the accused is said to 
have the intention of committing , otherwise no valid inf rence as to the 
intent could be made at all. 
(c) Wilson ' s case also established the proposition that it is 
not necessary that the crime intended should b in the place frequented. 
Recapping then , the 1 gal position with S.52 (1) (j) reflects that 
it is in an unhealthy state. General character is admissible to establish 
a person ' s known character , as are previous convictions if that reputation 
is challenged . 
It is contended that the belief of one police offic r is all hat 
is requir d to establish a person's reputation as a thi for suspected 
person - and in the usual case the policeman ' s evid•nc would be tr~atcd 
as the b st r1vailabl and s il r"a·onabJc bc1i f. 
An arrest for frequenting can be valic1c.tt d by cvidr>ncc unknown to the 
officer at the time of the arrest. Carri d cv n furth•r, a fals arr st under 
s . Sj .... h re a person in fact ,.as not "found offending" could pr sumably be 
validated by subsequent evidence which established tha lh accused was 
in fact offending. 
Under S.81
1
from the circumstances of the case and from the known 
character as can be proved
1
the police can impute an int nt to commit a crjm 
The courts can convict on the suspicions of the polic , which is totally 
inconsist nt with standard criminal principles . 
III.A. Crime Control Versus Due Process 
The individual ' s right to liberty and fr edom nd th competing 
demands of crime prevention in a mod•rn socic y ar of en difficult to 
r concile .
1 8 
The Statutes Revision Commission on he Police Off nc s Act 
stated the issue confronting them; "In any democracy, however, he position 
of he Police in relation to the citiz n is always i.l difficult and delicate 
one. On the one hand , unlimi d and arbitrary powers ves ed in the polic , 
even for war hy ends are rightly detes cd as the antithesis of a frN~ society . 
On the other hand the Police are clearly ntitlcd to those powers that are 
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necessary to carry out the task that the community has given them - to prevent 
and detect crime and bring offenders to justic . The problem is just where 
the balance should lie.
19 
Packer suggests that there exists between the two competing values, 
of Crime Control and Due Process , a basic consensus on th major ground 
rules of the criminal process. It is agreed tha the security and privacy 
of the individual may not be invaded at will , and that there are limits to 
the powers of the government to investigate and apprehend persons suspected 
of committing crimes . Also the notion embraced by such terms as the 
" adversary system" or "procedural due process " assumes that th alleged 
criminal is not merely an object to be acted upon, but an independ nt entity 
in the process, who may, if he so desires , force the operaLors of the process 
to demonstrate to an independent authority (judge and jury) that he is guilty 
of the charges against him . The Crime Control Model beqrudgingly acknowledges 
20 
the adversary system , while it is to the heart of lh Due Proc ss Model. 
The question of just where the d marcation line is to b drawn dep nds , in Lhe 
end on what value system one pref rs. Packer ' s Models shall serv to refl et 
the underlying µesupposit:o1 of the competing values and act as a backdrop 
to the discussion keyed to S . 52 (1) (j). For our purpose a conden d v rsion 
of Packer ' s original formulation has been produced sel cting those factors 
which best aid the discussion~
1 As tl1e r ader wil 1 see bnLh Models have a 
widely different int rpretation of what cons it.u 0s "legi imate " or proper 
police practic . 
B. Th Underlying Values of the Models 
( a) Crime Control . This value system ass Yts ha th r prcssion of 
criminal conduct is the most important ftmction of th, criminal process and one 
which society cannot do without , as it is he posi ivr guaran or of social 
freedom . 
If the police are perceived as failing to effectively con rol crime, 
as a r sult a disregard for 1 gal conlrol is f cilita ed so hat he citiz n 
Lhen becomes the victim of all sorts of invasions of his p rson a11d proper y -
in short his lib rty and security are severely r duccd. 
The major stress of the Crime Con rol Model is 011 effici ncy and 
speeding-up the criminal process so tha i isn ' t clu t red up wi h ceremonious 
rituals in the courtroom . Great mphasis is plac don he assumption that 
18 . Note . Use of vagrancy-type laws for ArrC>st and D en ion of 
Suspicious Persons. 59 Yale Law R view p. 135 
19. s atues Revision Committ e R port on th Polir0. Off,nccs Ac 1927 
(1972) p . 7. 
20. H. Pdckcr The Limits of he Criminal Sanction Stanford University Press 
(196 8) pp. 156-7 
21. For the original outline see H. Packer not 20 supra pp. 156-190. 
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police evidence is the most reliable indicator of probable guilt . It is the 
police who are trained and experts at fact-finding, as it is their job, and 
they can make a much better job of recreating the course of e v nts than the 
courts. Informal operations are preferred to formal - the stationhouse 
preferred to the court . The basic premise of this approach is that thos 
people who are probably innocent will be " scraned-out "early onin the process, 
because the police are better placed to determine probab]e innocence and in 
theory the innocent should have nothing to fear and be able to dispel sus-
picions surrounding them. 
However , those not screened-out and about whom a determination has 
been made that there is enough evidence of guilt to permit holding th m for 
further action must face a presumption of guilt - that is , in all probability 
they are guilty . Once the accuse d falls into this category h e is shunt d 
th rough the examin ing stages of the process rather mechanically. Tak n to 
its logical extreme; " ... the prosecutor mus t look at the criminal law not 
as something to be enforced becaus it governs society bu as an arsenal 
of weapons with which to incacerat certain d ngerous individuals who ar 
bothering society 11 •
22 
Therefore , one it has been de ermined that a person 
is probably guilty , he is proceeded against ai; a dangerous individual who 
should be punished before he bothers society . H'r , it is left v ry much 
to the police to define who is a "danq rous individual" or po en ial 
off nde r. 
(b) Due Process . This model champions the concep · of prjmacy of 
the individual , and stressPs the need for limi a ·ion of he State ' s official 
power. The stigma and loss of liberty attach d to th arrcsti~g and 
conviction of an accused is the heaviest form of d privation that a 
government can inflict on the individual. The coercive power of the Sa 
must be subjected to controls - to curb the thr al of tyranny and abuse of 
such powers . 
The Due Process model r jects the claim of the C ime Control Model 
that the inform 1 fact-finding ability of th polic r sul sin more reliable 
evid nee . This Model substi utes i with a formal , adjudicativ , adversary , 
fact-finding process in which the factu 1 case agains th accus dis publicly 
hard by an impartial tribunal , and is evaluated only ,fer the accus d has 
had an opportunity lo discr di the case against him . 
At thP heart of the Due Proc.ss Model is the prc!;urnp ion of Innoc nee. 
A person is not to be held guilty of a crime merely on the showing that in all 
probability, based upon reliable •vidence , he did ac u, lly what he is said to 
have done . The accused , und r this value: syst•m is presumed innocent until 
he has been proven guilty beyond all reasonabl, doub o b guilty of the 
22 . Thurman Arnold note 6 supra p . 153. 
used in rather cl different contcx 
and aims of the criminal law. 
It should be_noted th~t this quote is 
Arnold u3 s 1t referring to the objects 
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of the offence charged. 
The final strand of thought in the Due Process Model is a moocl of 
scepticism about the morality and utility of the criminal sanction . The 
criminal laws reliance on punishment as an educational and deterrent agent 
is misplaced , particularly in the case of the very members of society most 
likely to engage in criminal conduct ; and that its failure to provide for 
23 
indivualised and humane rehabilitation of offenders is inhuman and wasteful . 
This model doubts the propiety of a large proportion of the uses of 
the criminal sanction , as representing an unwis invocation of so extreme 
a sanction . This leads to pressure to limit the kinds of conduct the 
criminal sanction applies to and also the discr tion to exercis such 
power . 
(c) The Mo.dels in Operation - Practical Implications 
Crime Control: Normally the first stage of the process as 
it affects the suspect is the act of taking him into cust0dy w!1ere the 
police think that a crime has been committed , and that they have identified 
the person who committed it. Sometimes, however , the police will want to 
detain a person even though he is not suspected of having commitl d any 
specific offence. They may do this where they think a person is a 
generally suspicious character who on investigalion will likely turn oul Lo 
have done something criminal, or becaus they think lhat police int rvention 
by harassing him in this way might prev nt the commission of an offenc and 
induce him to stop engaging in som undesirable activity of which he is 
suspected. In short, the power of the police to arrest p ople forth 
purpose of investigation and prevention is one that must exis if the 
police are to do their job properly. 
The police should be entitled to arrest a person when they have 
probable cause to think he has corranitted a particular off•nc I!owev r, 
arrest should not be permissible only in tha si uation. The slight 
invasion of personal freedom and privacy involved in stopping a rson on 
the street to ask him questions or even taking him to he sta ionhouse for 
a period of questioning and other investigation is nee ssary in a wide 
variety of situations . For example ; 
24 
23. 
24 . 
(a) Peopl who are known to the polic as previous offenders 
should be subject to arrest a any time for the limited 
purpose of determining whether they have been engaging in 
criminal activities - especially when i is known that a 
crime of the sort thy hav committ d has taken place and 
that it was physically possible for them to have committed 
it . 
see P . Bator. Finality in Criminal Law and F deral Habeas Corpus 
for State Prisoners . 76 H rv. L . Rev. 441 , 442 (1963). 
~ -. !:~~~~!'- n.9_E .?9 S.;l)?!'il_,P.J?.: J]£'::J] 9,; .. ~~ , ... c. 1,..11 c y ><VJ.'-" .J.:J/J \....1..1.1L1 u.1'. 
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(b) Anyone who behaves in a suspicious manner, suggesting 
that he may b e "up to no good" should be subject to 
arrest for investigation. It may turn out that he has 
committed an offence, but more importantly the v ery 
act of stopping him for questioning, eith r on the 
street or in the stationhouse , may prevent the 
commiss ion of a crime. 
(c) Those who mak e a living out of criminal activity 
should be made to r ealise that the police know what 
they are up to and they will get caughl sooner or 
later. Therefore by harassing them, p riodically 
checking their activity , whether or not this 
involves an arrest or formal charge , will bring this 
attitude home to th m. 
(d) The polic have no rea on to abuse this pow r of 
arrest and hold innoc nt people . Any who arc 
"caught in the we b of suspicion " w.ill disp 1 
the suspicion and b screened-out of the proc ss. 
There are generally speaking , two kinds of d vices for giving the 
police adequat scope in making arrPsts for inves igc1tion . The first is 
what rn.ight b e call d the direc m thod: xplicitly providing broud 
powers to stop and question persons , irrespective> of wh ,th r they ar 
reasonably suspected of having committed a particular c1ime. The s cond 
is the indirect method : framir1s oroac.l enough definitions of criminal 
conduct to give the police the power to arr st on th orthodox probable 
cause basis, a wide variety of people who ar engag din s uspicious conduct . 
Vagrancy laws and disorderly conduct laws are xampl s . Th N w Zealand 
25 
police do not have a dir et pow r LO arrest for inves iga ion 01suspicioo. 
However S.52 (1) (j) is viewed by the police as a legitimate crim 
preven ion device , Lo deal with suspicious persons and dos enable arr st 
on suspicion . 
Due Process: 
(a ) It is a basic right of free men not to be subjec t o physic, l 
restraint except for "probable cause", for example ha a crime has probably 
been committ d and that he is the erson who probably commi t d it . Any 
less string nt standard op ns he door o th probabili y of grave abuse . 
(b) Soci ty must be prcpan'd to pay u pr i c0 for c1 commun i l:y th, t 
fos ers personal privacy and champions he digni y and fr•edom of th 
25 . In Blundell v. Attorney-General [1968) 
Court of Appeal was emphatic the polic 
questioning nor to hold while enquiries 
ZLR 341 Th New z aland 
hav . no pow r to hold for 
arc being made. 
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individual . That price inevitably involves some sacrifice in the efficiency
 
of crime control - an appeal to efficiency is never sufficient to justify 
an encroachment on the area of human freedom. 
The Due Process Model rejects , out of hand, wide and vague powers 
like S.52 (1) (j), as they do enable arrest on a standard less stringent than
 
probable cause. An accused is arrested on what the police suspect he is 
likely to do - in short mere suspicion . S.81 enables the police to infer 
the intent to commit a crime from the circumstances of the case and his 
known character as proved. As we have seen this is inconsistent with 
standard criminal principles - and for that reason the Due Process Model 
would call for its repeal . 
Such broad powers under S . 52 (1) ( j) increases the likelliood of abuse 
and arbitrary enforcement , as well as encouraging improper police practices 
such as holding devices to deal with suspicious persons . 
When the law is vague and uncertain the citizen is not s ufficiently 
warne d of what constitutes criminal conduct . In the United States vagrancy-
type statutes have increasingly come under constitutional attack for jusL 
such reasons - they fail to give notice of the prohibit d conduct and 
invited arbitrary enforcement .
26 
Such powers must be sacrific d for they 
allow the individual ' s fr edom to be invaded wilhout any other cause than 
suspicion . 
The Due Process Mod e l also rejects the proposition that he 
innocent law-abiding citizen has nothing to fear , and will be able to clear 
any suspicions he may have aroused , when questioned by lhc police . In th ory
 
o :v: ,,o uJ.d expect an innocent person would willingly be able tc answer ''\;rat 
he's about" and clear any s uspicions. lmy person has th right o silenc w
hen 
questioned by the police. The right to silence is the concrete and visible 
assertion of the fundamental principle that th prosecution must prove their 
case and that no obligation lies upon the accused to prove his innocence.
27 
However , reality paints a different picture; many suspects , flustered and 
in a stress situation under police scrutiny could well "pu their foot in 
it" answering enquiries . Their sloppy explanation may well get: th m 
arrested for frequenting . To go to the other end of the spectrum , the 
person who insists on his right to silence runs the risk of having an 
adverse infer nee drawn against him , both by the police on the spo who may 
arrest him for frequenting thinking he is covering up something , or vcn 
the court when r'creating the course of evens later . The irony therefore 
emerges that if you try and clear yourself and make a mess of it , or insist 
on your rjghts , it is still possible to be arr steu on S . 52 (1) (j). 
26 . see Curry note 2 supra. p. 46 the cases cited therein and "Orders 
to move on and the preven ion of Crime" in Vol . 87 Yale Law Journal 
1978 p . 603 for more recent cases. 
W. Miller Silence and Confessions-1·lhc1t arc 
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IV A. Civil Liberties Speaks Out 
S.52 (1) (j) offends many of the traditional standards of criminal 
procedure: and the presumption of innocence and th shunning of preventive 
arrest to name but a few, appear to fall by the wayside. There seems little 
semblance of natural justice in a provision which allows arrest on suspicion 
that a person was about to commit a crime. This hen explains the amount of 
obj ection in principle and criticism which has been levelled at the provision 
in the submission s made to the Statutes Revision Cornrnitt e . 28 Numerous 
overseas commentators have fired disapproval at similar vagrancy-type laws, 
and it is endeavoured to outline those elements which came in for the greatest 
amount of "flak", to provide useful fuel for thought. Before working 
through the criticisms it is important to note that each policeman has a 
di scretion to invoke such a provision - it is left very much up to th 
individual policeman to decide wha action to lake. As Goldstein suggests 
"Far from merely applying legal maxims in a ministerial manner, police 
emp l oy discretion in invoking th law. Thus , thy in fact , draw th outer 
perimeter of law enforcement , a power that is not offi.cially assigned to 
29 
them". Bittner chips in; II ... any po1 · ceman worlh hjs salt ought to be ahl 
to arrest almost anyone on formally def<>nsibl grounds with relativ ly lit 
effort . Naturally this condition creates favourabl conditions for the 
expression of personal prejudic ... "
30 
Wh.i.l . ano her corrun nta or propo 
that; " For the rough approximation of conununity valut!S ha emerg ,s from 
the l yislative process there is subr;tiluted the pers or al and often idio-
31 syncratic values of the law nforc r . 
( a ) Guilt by Reputation. As we haves n from h nalysis of 
s 
le 
the case law S . 52 (1) (j) enables the police to ctrr st a person where ther is 
no more than a mere suspicion that he is about to commit a crime . Th> police 
task is made that much easier by S . 81 which allows them o imput a f lonious 
intent from the circumstances of the case and from the known char cler of the 
accused. This character could probably be established by a simple stat ment 
from one police officer that h is of the opinion the suspect is a r'puted 
thief, and if such repute is challenged pr vious convic ions ar• adrnissibl 
to back up his claim , ( including hose unknown to him at the time of arrest ). 
Clearly the oclds are stack d against the accused - hardly a " fair gurne ". 
Douglas comm nts tha when " suspicion is the foundation of the convic ion , the 
28 . see generally submissions o h Statutes R,•vi sion Committee on th 
Police Offences Act 1927 (1972) 
29 . Goldstein . Police Discr ion ol ·o TnvokP the Criminal Process; 
Low Visibility Decisions in he Administration of Justice (G 9) Y<ll 
L . J . (1960 ) pp. 543-544 
30 . Egon Bitner . The rune ions of the Police in Mod rn Society .1970 p. 108. 
31 . II. Packer note 20 supra p . 290. 
- 15 -
presumption of innocence is thrown out the window .
11 32 
While the author of 
a note in the Yale Law Journal is prepar d to go ev n further; "In fact , if 
• h th b d th d f d t h • f • • 1 • II 3 3 not 1.n t eory , ey ur en e c en ans wi a presumption o cr1.m1.na 1.ty . 
You will no doubt note the familiar ring of one of the aims of the Crime 
Control Model in the last quot . 
(b) Circumvents the law of att mpts. The princip 1 doctrinal device 
that the traditional criminal law has relied on for dealing with pr epar a t ory 
conduct , and therefore for introducing some measur of preventive detention 
into the criminal law are the so-called inchoate crimes: attempt , conspiracy 
and incitement . The law of attempts
34 
is explicitly addr ssed to the 
problem of conduct that has not reached the ultimat ly appreh nded harm . 
However , an attempt diff rs substantially from S . 52 (1) (j) , and is at best 
an uneasy compromise between due process and crime control demands. 
Firstly there are only att mpts to commiL p ticular crimes. 
Secondly , an attempt requires a high ord r of proof that the ,c or really 
was engag din conduct that would have led to an off nc but for some 
mischange (e . g. getting caugh) rath>r than in activi y which looked 
suspicious , but was in fact innoc n and harmless. This assurance is given 
in two ways : first by insjsting on a showing that the actor hc1d a purpose 
to bring about the forbidden rcsu1{' second by r quiring proof th.:it his 
conduct brought him a subsLantial distan , on the ro<1d o achi.eving his 
obj ctive . The bench has been rous •d to criticism of improper polic practic' 
in employing vagrancy law.3 . In D n (1924) ]8 Crim. App . R . 133 a p. 134 
Lord Hewart C . ,J. del iverin9 Lhe judgment of h English Court of Appeal 
stated , after the "'C"used had be n convictn~ of loit ring with intent; " It 
looks v ry much as if it was thought the was no nou~1 videncr o ch<lrge 
the appellant with attempted hous bre king anc.1 this oLh r m thocl was adopt d. " 
He continued to condemn the use of the loi ering with in c•n · provision to 
uphold a conviction where the evidence was insufficien to uphold a eh rge to 
attempt to commit a crime . Th0 police readily admi 
36 
alternative charge . 
o u<·ing S . 52(1) (j) as an 
Talbot J . in the cas of Caldwell (1927) 20 Crim . App.R . p.GO 
comment d; " The Vagrancy Act of 1824 is not int nd'd c1s a convenien m thod 
of supplying a hiatus in the evidenc> of a felony . " Similar c nsures have 
32 . Douglas Vagrancy and Arr st on Suspicion 70 Yal L.J . (1960) 1 , p . 11. 
33 . Noe note 18 supra p . 1352 
34 . see S . 72 of th Crimes Act 1961 . 
35 . Not th~t ac ual intent is r quir d v n though the principal crim 
can be committed recklessly - see R. v . Mohan [1 75) 2 All E.R . 193. 
36 . Curry note 2 supra pp 135-136 . 
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37 
have been voiced in the New Zealand Courtroom . 
Where the attempt charge fails because of a lack of evidence th 
police can indirectly "nail" the suspect for something at least, be it 
nothing more than they suspected he was about to commit a crime - S.52 
(1) (j) provides such an alternative charge. This circumvention of the 
stricter requirements of attempt should not be conaoned - as Douglas suggests 
it encourages inefficiency and lax police practic s . 
38 
(c) A supplement to the Limits of the Law of Arrest. Packer 
reveals that one of the covert functions of the criminal sanction is 
exemplified by the use of vagrancy and disorderly conduct laws to provide 
39 
the police with powers that they do not possess under the law of arrest . 
Caleb Foote has this to say; "one cannot escape the conclusion that the 
administration of vagrancy-typ laws serves as an escape hatch to avoid the 
rigidity imposed by real or imagined defects in the criminal law and 
procedure To the extent that such rigidity pres nts a r :11 or imagined 
problem and that the need for a safety valve is not m r ly the product of 
inefficiency on the part of police or prosecutors such a problem should 
not be dealt with by indirection. If it is necessary to case th 
prosecutions burden of proof or to legalise arr,sts form re suspicion , 
then the grave policy and constitutLonal problems posed by such sugg stions 
should be faced . If present rcst:r.ictions on the laws of att mpts or 
arrest. place too onerous a burden upon the police uecause of the nature of 
modern crime , then such propositions should be discussed and resolved on 
. . 40 k h h their merits . Curry remar·s ta t police often feel the nPed to d tain 
and investi<:,iutt! without actually arresting on a major eh .cge . 'l'he broad 
and vague vagrancy provisions can b pressed into service to achi ve the 
same end result as would express powers of arr st on suspicion . lie 
adopts much the same t ack as that xpressed by Foote, if he police need 
such powers they should be expressed cl ly and openly, not shrouded in he 
41 
width and vagueness of the vagrancy laws. 
37 . per Luxford S .M. in Fell v. Gauntlett (1949) 6 M.C.D. 48 . 
Shorland J . in Devon v. Police [1961) NZLR 261 
Cooke J . in Police v. Bazl y (1976) 3 NZLR 152 at p. 159 
Mahon J . in Police v. Thomas (1974] tZLR 558 at p . 561 
38 . Douglas note 31 supra p .11. 
39 . H. Packer note 20 supra pp . 293-294 . 
40. Caleb Foote Vagrancy-type Law and its Administration 104 Univer. Pa . L .R. 
(1956) 603 , pp . 649-650 . 
41 . Curry note 2 supra pp . 130-132 . 
• 
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(d) Preventive Detention. Considerable tension exists between the 
goal of prevention and the idea that the criminal law is limited to past 
identifiable conduct .
42 
As a general rule our law does not countenance the 
arrest of a person whom the polic suspect of being likely to commit an offence 
if no attempt to commit it has been made. 
Preventive detention then sanctions arrest, not on what a suspect has 
actually done , but on what it is suspected he will do in the future . Packer 
hints that perhaps the bulk of arrests on suspicion do not have a motive 
with even a degree of pseudo-legality; ''Rather such arrests reflect the 
view that these people may engage in bad conduct in the future and that, if 
they are harassed in advance , both their opportunity and their incentive to 
43 
engage in criminal conduct may be reduced. Preventiv detention can be 
accomplished under the guise of punishment for crimes committed, if th 
definition of the crime is sufficiently vague and lastic. This is very 
much the case under S . 52 (1) (j) - by stablishing a person's crim the 
suspect i · puni hed largely for what he may h ve done in the past and is 
therefore considered likely to do now. No person should be subj cted to 
arrest until he has translated his intention into some concr te r.paratory 
act which constitutes an atlempt to commit a particular offence. If one 
reject"' arrest on suspicion then atl mpts is s far as one can go o 
effect a r solution between th claims of civil libP1 is and crime 
prevention. 
(e) Abuses Exposed Overs as. There is a profusion of ma •rial which 
illustrates that vagrancy-type statues ar of en abus ·d. Whil crime 
pr8vention is claimed to be the :,......i.r.iary objective of the vag.a.ncy laws -
as Duffy postulates this lab 1 is somewhat confusing in reality, as vagrancy 
statut s are used to investigat past or r sen off nc sin a gr~a many 
cases. Foote comments that whil such st tutes "make punishable acts pc>tty 
in terms of social dangerousness. 11
4 ; their chi f importanc li s in their 
quanlitative impact and administrative us,fuln ss.
45 
They bestow th 
police with a residual discretionary power to control suspicious people, 
and; "facilitate the apprehension, inves iga ion or hara sment of suspec d 
criminals. When suspects can l>e arr st d for no hing ls i is often 
46 
possible to "go an vag them." 
Packer suggests ''the pro o ype of the ou righ viola ion is the 
arres for "inves igation" or "on suspicion." 'J.'h , i cl al of he law of arrest 
is that no person may be depriv d of his freedom, ven morn ntarily, unl ss 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
Packer note 20 supra p.97. 
Packer note 20 supra p.98. 
Duffy Stop and Frisk 53 Cornell L.R. (1968) 899, 412. 
C. Foote note 40 supra pp 613-614 
C . Foote note 40 supra p.614 
• 
• 
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there is probable cause that he has committed a crime. But that ideal is 
flouted in practice hundreds of time s every day. People who arouse the 
suspicions of the police that they may be up to no good are take n into custody 
sometimes for only a few minutes , sometimes for days, 01. e v n we ks - out of 
. . 47 
a variety of preventive motives. He points out that if a crime is defined 
in a s uffici e ntly vague and elastic manner, people can be arrested ostensibly 
because they are "vagrants", but in fact because they are likely to commit 
. d 48 . 
offences unless restraine . In his section on covert functions of criminal 
sanctions Packer lis ts as one example harassment. Here he polic tactic 
is often aimed not at prosecution and conviction but at "making life difficult" 
for the suspectedi;erson so that he will either stop what he is doing or go 
49 
do it someplace lse . 
The most frequent abuse dug up is the use of vagrancy statuL s as 
holding devices - to enable the police to conduct furth r investigations into 
past or present crimes, or to look into more serious investigations , where 
so 
noth ing can be specifical l y "pinned-on " the suspect . Not surprisingly 
v agrancy statutes have been stamped as the " catrh-all " of the criminal law
1151 
or as an " all-purpose control devic 
II 52 
l\ form r chief inspector of the 
City of London said this oft.he corre>sponding English provisjon ; " this is a 
much abused provision , and one of tyrannical s cope which gives he lie to 
the BriLish boast that the citiz•n cannot be h•ld in cu~tody on mere 
suspicion - he can be imprisoned for 3 month ~;.,._ on th m re suspj c.im th t 
he was in the slreet to st al. .. It has also given ris to many injus ic s 
and many convictions falling far short of th standurds r quir din oth •r 
c:1..1.miual cases. It is the prov ·sion . . . which should br> the firs to be 
repealed in any adequate revision of the criminal law.
1153 
The Statutes Revision Commi tee relied on their opinion when w~ighing 
up their recommend tion on S.52(1) (y) t.hat th criticisms of it wer almost 
withou •xception of a gen ral natur and th<l th y rece i.ved almost no 
. . . [ b 54 Th concrete evidence of any clear and specific ins ances o a us . · 
police in their submissions emphasise the sam~ th me - d•spi e cri icisms 
of an academic na"Lure there are none on the qrounds of actual abuse of 
the provisions by the Police .
55 
What then dos all hi s rc•ally mean - are 
47 . 
48 . 
49 . 
so . 
Pack~r not~ 20 supra p . 98 53. 
Packer note 20 supra p . 98 54. 
Pack r note 20 su ra pp 293-4 
C . Foote not 40 supra pp Gl3- 17 55. 
E . Bittner note 30 supra pp 10 , 111 
Williams no 37 supra p . 661 , 
Budnitz no e 3 supra p . 441-442 
Campbell and i· hi tmore Freedom in Australia 
Chevigny Police Power (1969) p . 232 
Vol. 8 Yale Law J. not· 26 supra p. 03 
T . Arnold note 7 supra P . 172 
C. Foo e note 40 supra . 614 
Bittner not 
C .H. Rolph Law Ri·form Nov .(1963)p . 24 
R port of Statutes R vision ConuniLt 
no e (l) supra p .7. 
Submissions of the Police Dep . o 
th Statutes Revision Committee 
l2 months in New Z aland . 
p.20 
• 
• 
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there really no abuses of S . 52(1) (j)? It would be unrealistic to give a 
positive answer to the question posed. The police naturally aren ' t going t o 
openly admit to abuses committed within th force , so in the end it may mean 
nothing more than the New Zealand police are more efficient at concealing 
abuses than their overseas counterparts . Other possibilities which can ' t b e 
dismissed are that a person may be u naware of an abuse (that the police 
have overstepped their power) , or may be justtoo plain s:ared -iodo anyt hing 
about i t for fear of reprisals by the police . Do we then accept the props i tion 
that such abuses are t he actions of a minority - the black sheep of the f l ock . 
The t rend wh i ch emerges from points forementioned and in view of the pressure 
the po l ice exerted to retain the provision substantially as it stands , tends 
t o point in another d irection. The police regard S . 52 (l) (j) as a residual 
means of dealing with suspicious µ:rsons and as a legitim te crime prevention 
device . The provision is organisationally necessary and administratively 
useful to them. At the end of the day the answer seems to be that abuses 
are more widespread than originally suspected and not the roblem of a few 
black sheep . 
B . Crime Controls ' Right of Reply . 
What case can be made out for the retention of S . 52(1) (j)? The 
. 56 
special aim of the vagrancy statutes is wi<lc ly r cogniscd as crime pr vention. 
Taking the Crime Control Mode l to is logic..il 'xtreme the argum nt goes 
something like this ; the police are the on ' !, 1iest pL:1ced to know whether a 
person is likely to commit un offcnc so why not step in and ac hefore some-
thing really does happen . Crime prevention has be n elabora ed on earlier 
in the article , but points which relat mor specifically to vagrancy 
provisions similar to S.52 (1) (j) shall be includ d at this stag . 
Crime prev ntion is based on th assumption ha pr v ntion is 
better than cure . It is better to " nip in the bud " a potential offender 
who has by acting suspiciously shown that h is lik ly to commit c1 crim . 
Duffy extracts two limbs to preventive power . . Fir-tly , they can serve> as 
a melhod to stop eopl getting into trouble , from " ravelling th roud to 
ruin '' . Secondly, they can be used where ci1e person ' s behaviour h s indicated 
h · 1 ·} 1 t · t · · f · th chance . 
5 7 
e is i(e y o commL a crime i given e 
Proponents of crim~ prevention go to grea lengths to str ss the 
importance of the role of the police in crim prev ntion . They assert that 
for the proper performance of this function the police n ed the authority to 
. d 1 h h 1 · l · · 
58 
forcibly detain indivi ua swot ey suspec ar ike y to cornm1.l: crime . 
56. 
57 . 
58 . 
Curry note 2 supra p . 35 s e authorities ci ed th r in . Vol . 87 Yale 
Law Journal 1978 nol 26 supra cases ci l'd ther in. 
Duffy note 44. supra p . 912 . 
Duffy note 44 supra . 912 c . Foote note 40 supra p . 614 
Luxford Police Law in ew Zealand 3rd cd 
Perkins Th 
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Foote stat es that "Administratively vagrancy-type statutes are regarded as 
essential criminal preventatives"~
9 
Another commentator emphasises the need 
for the police to have the authority to temporarily detain and investigate 
without arrest or charge, and that the use of supicious persons statutes 
to effect this purpose merely reflects the importance of this authority to 
60 
effective law enforcement. 
The case made out for the retention of provisions such as S.52(1) ( j ) 
is base d on the argument that if s uch powers are impaired "the security of tte 
citize n would be grieviously weakened
1161 and that the police performance of 
11 62 
thei r crime prevention duty would be stultified. Luxford , having admitted 
they are a departure from well-established principles is of the v iew that 
"experience has shown that a vagrancy code is indispensable in any country 
d . f . d d d · · · 
116 3 
esirous o preserving peace an goo or er a~ong its citizens. In view 
of the attacks on vagrancy statutes in the United States with the r sult that 
• some h ave been declared unconstitutional by the courts it would se m that a 
vagrancy code is no longer "indisperrable " - one could query wheth r in fact 
it ever has been. Luxford's view does not hold much w ight . While some 
judges criticise the abuse of vagrancy statut·s , the bench also has judges 
• 
. . . 64 
who have come out in support of the fr quenling provision . 
The di lemma is to decide whe thcr the sociu lJ y d 'S i.rabJ c ends of er im 
prevention justify the means of S . 52(1) ( j) . 
v (a ) Consideration of the Role of the Police. It has becom nee ssary 
to look into the rol of the Police and to examine how in facl t.h~y carry out 
their mandate , what sort of prcvenlive role should they perform and how far 
can their powers be limited if thy arc to remain effective agents of social 
control? 
A common assumption by the public at large is that the police rol is 
confin d primarily to law endorccm nt, crime control - tl1e prevention of 
serious crime and the apprehension and prosecution of criminals , and k Qping 
the peace. Comm ntators are only now moving way from his charac risa ion 
of the police role , and beginning to capture the actuali i :; of wha the 
65 
police ask involves on a typical tour of duty . 
59. C . Foote note 40 supra p . 614 
GO . Note note 18 supra p.1358 
Gl . Perkins note 58 supra p . 252-3 
62. sec the corrunents of Mahon J . in R.V . O ten (1977) 2 NZLR 44 at p .4 5 
63 . Luxford note 58 supra p . 847 
64. Luxford S . M. on Fell v. G unllet note 3 supra p . 50 
also Mahon J . in R. v. Ott•n note 62 supra p.45 
65 . E . Bittner note 30 supra pp . 2-3 , 29 , 40 , 43-44 
E . Bittner Florence Nightingale in Pursui of Willie Sutton: A Theory oft.he 
Police 
In H. Jacob "The Po ten ial for the Reform of Cn.minal Justice" 17 , pp . 22-23 , 30 
Gold st.ein Polic Formulations: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance 
65 Mich L.R. (1967) 1123 , pp.1124-1125. 
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In reality only a small percentage of time the average policeman s
pends on 
duty directly relates to handling serious offences.
66 
Bottomley states that 
most contacts which the police have with the public relate to enti
rely 
"neutral services. " In an emergency of almost any type - of human
 relations 
of health , of nature , the police are amongst the first to be calle
d in , and 
h t d t d th
. ab . 67 B. . 
t ey are expec e o o some ing out it. it ner continues a
long that 
line commenting that the police are called upon to cater with an i
mmense 
array of activities that have nothing to do with law enforcement , 
but are 
primarily oriented to easing some social strain or to deal with so
me human 
problem, where people feel inadequate to cope themselves. This in
cludes such 
tasks as; assisting the aged and the mentally ill; locating missin
g persons , 
providing emergency medical services, mediating disputes between h
usbands 
and wives, landlords and tenants, or shopkeepers and customers, ca
ring for 
neglected children , investigating accidents , giving dir ctions, to
 getting a 
drunk off the street before he hurts himself.
68 
Bittner then goes on to examine what it is about the police role 
that sets them apart from others in society , and enables them to d
eal "inform-
ally" with the many problems that come their way . 
Th central thread to the explanation Bittner advance s is tha 
und rlying all their actions is the knowlcdg~· that thL olic(• mand
 te 
confers on them a unique capacity to US' force as alas resort; "
the 
authorisaLion and obligation to use fore ... is the xclusiv • mon
opoly of 
th police. No other official in any branch of civil government h
as this 
right of duty ," so that, "On th baris of practical con:;id •ra ions
 n i her 
the government nor the citiz nry could presumably do without i 
.. 69 Th 
police then deal with all the problems and exig ncies in which for
ce may have 
to be used to meet them . Bittner also concludes th t arrest is on
ly one of 
the resources available to the polic to handle any given situation
, and one 
that is rarely invoked by he av rage policeman a thut; "In he ty
pical case 
the formal charge juatifies the arrest a patrolman makes bu is no
t the 
r ason for it . The actual reason is located in h domain of the 
need to 
handle the situation and invoking the law is merely ad vice wher 
by ·his is 
66. According to the International Association of Police Chi~fs th
e percentage 
of polic ffort devoted to traditional criminal law ma ters docs 
not exceed 
ten per cent . See Niedhoffer, Behind ·he Shi ld: The Polic in Ur
ban 
Society , N.Y. Anchor Books 1969 p.75 
E. Cwruning, I. Cumming and L. Edell Policeman as Philosoph r Guide 
and Friend 
Social Problems 12 (1965) p. 276-286 
M. Banton The Policeman in he Communi i, N. Y. Ba _,i c Books J 964 
67. A.K. Bottomley Decisions in ·he Penal Proc0ss 1 73 p . 45 
68. E. Bittner note 30 supra p.43-44 
see also H. Goldstein no e 65 supra p.1124-1125 
69. E. Bi tner note 30 supra p.34 
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sometimes accomplished .
1170 
Goldstein agrees and chimes in with this 
observation ; " However , for everytime that a police officer arrests a perso n 
h e a lso disposes of scores o f incidents by employing a lesser form o f a uthority 
h d • 1 t II 7l sue as or ering peop e o move on ... 
What t his indicates then is that in the vast majority of cases 
informal po l icing such as warnings are sufficient to deal with poblems . 
The warn ings are obeyed because those involved know that underlying them is 
t he threat that the police may ultimate l y fall back on legitimised force 
and arrest if they aren 't. Shearing adds a further component exclusive t o the 
po l ice ro l e which may account further for their abili y to handle situations 
informal l y . Besides access to legitimised physical force , he postulates 
that the police also have a special access to law enforcement as a means 
o f maintaining order . While this isn ' t always nee ssarily used , the 
pub l ic v ery much perceive the policeman as a problem-solver , who has-a-special 
72 
-access-to-l aw-enforcement . Therefore what pus the "punch" behind a 
police warning or threat is the public ' s respect for the fact that ul imately 
the police can hav recourse Lo the law on their side and as a last resort 
J 
73 
invoke physical force to effect an arr sl . 
Other distinguishing features of the police rol• is that they ar in 
74 
effect th- only agents of social control availabl 24 hours around the clock . 
The polic role is for the most part. reactive - in response to citiz n requests 
and complaints , wh re they are summoned and expect d to do something about 
7S 
what v r prompled the call . 
The police therefor . view S.52(1) (j) as providing a last resort to 
arrest a suspicious person for fr quenting , where ei her a warning is felt 
inappropriate to handle the situation , or thy believe th warning will b 
flouted . They would argue of cours that if S . 52(1) (j) was rep•aled the 
legal Lhrcat b •hind such warnings would be removed , and as a consequence Lh 
warnings would be ignored . The writer however n•ither shares this fear nor 
accepts it as a valid proposition . Th~ police practice of issuing warnings 
d 
. l . 76 . 
and the power to do so are base on unc rain lega authority . It is 
70 . 
71 . 
72 . 
73 . 
74 . 
75 . 
76 . 
E . Bitner not 65 supra p . 27 A theory of th · Police 
H . Golds ,•i11 note 65 supra p .1125-112(, 
C . D. Shearing Reconsidering he Polic0 Role: A ci1all ngc ·o the Challeng 
of a popular cone ption 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Corr c io11 . 331 pp . 338-339 
C . O. Shearing no e 72 suprtl p . 142 
E . Bit n r A Theory of th • Pol1c note 65 sup <l p . 3) 
C.U . Shearing note 72 supra p . 343 
C . D . Shearing " Dial a Cop" A S udy of Polic lobi li il ion in R . Akers and 
E . Sagarin, Crime Prevention and Social Control J • 77 
E . Bittner A Theory of he Police note 65 supra ~rp . 30-31 
A. Bottomly note 67 supra p . 95 
GoldstPin no e 65 suprct p.11112 
Vol. 87 Yale Law Journal no 26 supra p . 618 
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clear that they do have power to advise someon to mov on if they arc 
obstructing the footpath , but that is a very limited pow r indeed . It is the 
writer ' s contention that the average person in the street is hardly likely 
to know that if he doesn ' t obey a warning the police may arrest him for 
frequenting . The answer lies more in the arguments proposed by Bittner 
and Shearing earlier. The public have traditionally respected the polic 
and their authority , and obey their warnings because of the knowledge that 
under l ying those warnings is the threat that they may be arrested for 
something, if they don ' t obey . The inherent authority of the Pol·ce is 
more the reason than an awareness of S.52 (1) (j) ' s exislence , and it is 
suggested this will continue to be the case. S . 52 (1) (j) is not the only 
offence which the police may arrest on. The Polic , if they f el an arrest 
is necessary as a last resort , on would suspect could arrest on some other 
offence . As Bittner mentiones ; "For instance, the susp nsion of the vagrancy 
statutes need not in any way aff et the rat of persons who wer earlier 
arrested under these provisions . They are s·mply charged with some other 
77 offenc . Harking b ack to a theme alr ady hamm red horn is th proposition 
that any policeman worth his salt ought to be able to arr•st almost anyon 
on formally defensible grounds with relatively littl cffor . 
(b) An ace ptable crim thrus t of this sec ·on 
is to illuslrate that S . 52(1) (j) is an abuse of all hat the crimi.nal law 
stands for . It is un11ec ssary in practic and ore provision w could w 11 do 
without. The same ends can be achi •ved by " informal" rnl'ans so it: can saf ly 
be repealed. The police claim:; ha heir crim pr•ven ion rol will be 
severely impaired are unfounded. In ninet:y-nine perc n of th cases tlie 
mere presence of the police or a warning to th p rson acting suspiciou ly 
that th police are "keeping an ey on him" and hav him und r surveillance 
would suffice to frighten off th would-be off n er from committing a cri.me. 
This in the writer ' s view , is t:he only ace pt~,l crim~ pr vention 
role for dealing with suspicious p rsons , if the susp c fails to do ~;orne act 
which will satisfy the law of at.: mpts to commit a particular crime. An 
arrest on suspicion alone permi s an arbi rary in erferenc with an individual's 
freedom - a state of affairs which should no exis in any criminal code. 
VI. The Police case for Re ntion of S . 52(1) (j) 
Having culled from the ovcrse·s litera urea rela iv• perspective 
of abuses which occur in oh r countries it is n•c ssary to look a how he 
police actually us S . 52(L) (j) in New Zealand . In doing so we shall examine 
the Police submissions to the S atut s Revision Comrni r·, which op ·ed in 
favour of r aining the provision subs an ially in i ~ presen form. 
77 . E. Bittner note 30 supra p . 109 
-.. 
• 
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Curry concluded; "In terms of police powers the vagrancy laws are an 
enigma. They confer draconian power , but on the whole appear to be sensibly 
administered in New Zealand.
1178 
Curry based his conclusions on information 
he received from interviews with the police. One is largiy restricted lo 
that source when attempting such an enquiry - but along with the note of 
acution previously sounded it is the writer ' s opinion that the police 
information should be taken with a grain of salt . The impression the writer 
gains from the police pressure to retain the provision is that it is felt to 
b e organisationally necessary to their crime pr vention role to deal with 
suspicious persons - and that abuses of the provision are accordingly more 
widespr ad than at first thought. It is difficult lo envisage a sensible 
use of a provision which is based on suspicion , and therefore Curry's 
conclusion does not tie in with the writer's impression, that it is us d 
improperly. 
The police submitted that the frequen ing provision makes a valuabl 
contribution to the protection of the public. The provisions fills the gap 
where an attempt or conspiracy cannot be prov~d , but the known character of 
the suspect makes his int ntions in the circumstances obvious . One mus 
query whether it is possible to determine wh th r d suspcct ' s inten ions are 
absolutely obvious - would i no b mor • t ue to say tha only his lik ly 
intentions are obvious. The law of att mpts is not asy t.:o satisfy and 
pros cutions oft n cc1n 't be brought becaus the bllbjec has no gone beyond 
preparation for the offence which is too r>mote to con!.il:itule an< tt.:cmp .
79 
The police cont nd that without h provision th ·y would b' severely 
hampered in dealing with child molesters and oLn r s~xual offenders . Police 
often observe known sex offenders endeavouring o entic children to a 
secluded place . The police reasoning is tha th•y can ' t allow th. child o 
be entic d away and must inter£ re before an offenc, is actually commi ed . 
They stress th t because of the suspects ' history his in 'n ions are pa ently 
clear. 
These provisions are also widely us d agains burglars , car converters , 
and thiev s . When a criminal is observed preparing for the commission of one 
of these offences , it may happe n tha his ac ions do no con~titu can 
att ·mpt. However, a thief or car converter who pe rs into num rous cars or 
a burglc1r who is observ d going to the doors of several hous rand when Lhe 
hous hold •r op ns the door asks the directions to a non-existen address makes 
his intent cl ar . To back up hcs claims they gave illustrations of the 
80 
practical application of S.52(1) (j) 
78. Curry note 2 supra p . 142 . 
79. see generally Police Submissions to th Statute~ Rcvisjon 
Commi t:te on the Police Offences Act 1927 (1~72) pp 15-17 
80 . Polic Submissions note 79 supra pp 15-16 
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( i) A , a convicted sex offender, was seen to try and entice a 10 
year old boy into his car . The boy refus d. A was l ater 
interviewed and charged with frequenting . 
(ii) 
(iii) 
B, a known sex offender, followed or walked with a youth for a 
di s tance of 3/4 mile. B talked to the youth about sex, h is 
girlfriends and at one stage asked him to spend the night at his 
flat. B was convicted of frequenting. 
C, a convicted thief, was seen in th early hours of th 
walking along a city street and looking into motor cars. 
morning 
C was 
furtive in his actions and looked into Pight different cars and 
was seen to try the doors of three of Lh em . He wc1s arr sted and 
convicted of frequenting. 
(iv) D, a convicted thief, was observed crawling along the aisl sand 
behind seats ln a picture while a screening WLS in progress. He 
was convicted of fr quenting . 
. . . h th 1 · 81 . abl From an 1.nterv1.ew wit e po 1.c one 1.s e to gauge the curr nt. 
practice of t.he police in using S . 52 (1) (j). The provision hLs been used 
roughly eight times in the last 12 months in the Wellington rajon ( 1 76-1977 
period) . It is used mainly agalnsl sexual off •nd rs , against transvesti s 
soliciting near public conveniences. In most cLses if a person i~; seen to 
be goi ng " a bit off the rails" the policc would administer a stern warning 
to the susprct and advise him t.o say out of trotilile in th futur• . However , 
if the suspect is a persistcn offE'ndcr, t.h0.n thl stiff r prcventiv measure 
of arrest will b used. 
The police also pointed out in their submissions hat substanti< l 
sentences as a preventive measur are not oft·n imposed and th sentence of 
• preventative detention for off nders other than r p ted sexual offenders 
has been abolished. Periodic d tention sen enc s ar of en impos d wh r the 
offender is only in custody for the w ekends . Bearing this in mind, the 
provision~ of S . 52 (1) (j) combined with S . 81 arc a small cone ssion for the 
legislature to make in providing som prot.cc ion to h public from sexual 
offenders as w 11 as dishones offenders . 
The conclusion to be dr wn from th polic 
82 
argum nts 1.s p1ainly , that 
an arr st und r S . 52(L) (j) is r re . Th mer• pr • enc of the police and the 
issue of warnings - in short " informal" r, ans achi VP the same degree of crime 
prevention. The added advan ge wi h th se method" is that hey don ' L offend 
the value of civil lib r ies. I is timP to s dk S.52(1) (j) from he statue 
ooks - it is a blemish on th crimin 1 law, and an unnPccssary one at that . 
81. l\ Detective - Inspector of lw C . LB. , W 1 ljngton 
82 . Police Submissions note 79 supra p . 17. 
• 
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'2[1. Conclusion. 
Set out below are salient factors to be considered when appro ching 
a discussion of the limits of the criminal sanction. The criminal sanction 
inflicting as it does a unique combination of stigma and loss of lib rty 
should be resorted to only sparingly in a society that regaids itself free 
and open . It should be reserved for what really matters jn terms of 
social dangerousness. While a criminal sanction may successfully prevent 
and reduce the conduct in question , the moral and practical costs must be 
reckoned in terms of such values as liberty and freedom.
83 
The prevention of crime is an essential asp et of the environmental 
protection required if autonomy is to flourish. It is however , an gative 
aspect and one which pursued with single-minded zeal may end up creating 
" an environment in which all are saf but none is fr e " ... Lh ultimat goal 
11 84 
of law in a free society which is to liberate rather than restrain. 
"The criminal sanction is at once prime guarantor and prime 
threatener of human freedom. Used providently and humanely it is 
guarantor , used indiscriminately and coercively it is threaLener. Th 
tensions that inhere in the criminal sanc.:tion can nev r b' wholly r solv d, 
85 
in favour of guaranty and against threat." 
Packer formulates a number of criteric1 which l:his writer r gards 
as being essential prelimin<1.ry consideratiotts in th reform of th Jaw. 
Pack r argues that conduct should only be rend n·<l criminal if: -
(1) The conduct is prominen in most peopl ' s view of socially 
threatening behaviour , and is not condoned by any significan s gm~nt of ·he 
society. 
(2) subjecting it to th, criminal <·anc ion is not inconsis en· 
with the goals of punishment . 
( 3) suppressing it will no inhibit socially desirabl conduct. 
(4) it may be dealt with through even-h ndl•d and non-discriminatory 
enforcement. 
(5) controlling it through the criminal proc ss will not expose that 
proc>ss to severe qualitative or quantitative s rains. 
(6) there are no reasonable alternative~ o the criminal sanction 
1 . . h . 86 for dea ing wit it. 
Let ' s work through Lhe re l evunt crit ria and apply them to S . 52(1) (j) 
It is i.1co:.sistent with the goal::; of punishment to arrest and punish on 
83 . II. Pack r note 20 supra p . 250 
84 . H. Packer note 20 supra p 65-66 
85. II . Pack r no e 20 supra p.3 6 
86 . H. Pack r note 20 supra p. 29 
- 27 -
suspicion - not for what somebody has done but what it is suspected he is 
likely to do . In suppressing suspicious conduct by arrest one cannot escape 
the danger that the innocent may be caught in the web of police suspicions . 
When this is so,socially desirable conduct may well be inhibited . A person 
may be taking a perfectly innocent stroll late at night , arouse police 
suspicions and end up fronting-up on a frequenting charge , if he is unable to 
satisfactorily explain his actions . It is very much left in the hands of the 
police to define if somebody " is up to something" - as is the discretion to 
invoke an arrest under S.52(1) ( j ) as a method of dealing with a situation. 
With the broad and vague interpretation given S . 52(1) (j) the opportunity for 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is heightened. The chance is there 
for a policeman to take out his prejudices and ev n the scor _ with a person 
who has annoyed him - the frequenting provision provides him with a conv nient 
means of " something to charge him with ." The uncertainty which prevails in the 
case law to date does not make good law - vague and inconsistent decisions 
constitute a qualitative strain on the process. Finally and most importantly , 
there is a reasonable alternative to an arr st for frequenting . This 
alternative is consistent with the established principles of the criminal 
law, the values of civil lib rtics and doesn ' t severely impair the police 
preventive role, or deprive soci ty of tha l•ment of crime revention 
considered socially desirable . One is t<1lking of cours of the informal 
handling of suspiciou~ persons - by the mere prPsenc of the polic or by 
the issuing of warnings to suspects to deter them from committing a crime. 
The Statutes Revisicm Committee took a pragmatic vi w when consid ring 
th8i..r recommendations on S . 52 (1) 'j). Wh.il • conceding Im ... the objections ir 
principle hud some weight , they were heavily swayed by the police viclence 
of the value of the provision as a preventive power. ag ins known offenders 
for behaviour falling short of a criminal a •mpt . They, th •r fore, 
compromised and adopted a mjddl of the road course - to meet som of th s 
objections , while retaining , for the police , he use of prev ntive powers.
87 
The Committee recorrunended that i · should be an offence o be found in a public 
place committing suspicious ac s , i . e ., acts which a n.>a<.,;onabl person would 
believ to be preparation for a crime . Th notion of "r pute of a thief" 
would disappear and the section would focus no on " felonious inten " bu 
on thC' person ' s actual conduct . Previous convictions would be admissible 
in evJdence o assist in proving the suspicious na urc of the acts. 
The writ r rejects this piec meal reform. Firstly , the reform 
proposal does li tle to answer the fundamental cri icisms raised earlier in 
the article. The power invest •d in he police js still broad and open to 
abuse . The proposal permits urrcs on mere suspicion , so that th danger of 
87 . see p . 31 of The Sta utes Revision Committee R port (1972) 
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unwarrantable interference yjfi) an individual ' s freedom is not eliminated. 
Allowing previous convictions to ass.is: in proving the suspicious nature of 
acts is prejudicial to the suspect , and contravenes one of the basic rules of 
the law of evidence . 
Two other alternative proposals to that recommended by the Statutes 
Revision Committee , which attempt to bypass the use of arrest and to 
substitute instead periods o f temporary detention for dealing with suspicious 
persons, also fall under the chop of the writer ' s axe. 
The first is a formulation for an express detention statute , in 
other words, a statutory holding device.
88 
The poJice would have the power to 
detain a person whom they suspected o f likely criminal intent. Detention 
would not constitute an arrest or be recorded as such , therefore the element 
of stigma would be avoided. If insufficient grounds are unearthed for a 
specific charge , the suspect should then be released without furth r formalities . 
• The second is set out in the Yale Law Journal, and is labell d tre 
• 
89 
"move-al ong" proposal. This statute would expressly authorise a police 
office r to u se an order to move on . The officer would be requir d to have 
"reasonable cause to s uspect " that a person was about t:o commit an off nee -
if the suspect gives a credible explanaLion which shows h is engaged in 
innocr>nt activity th e officer has no authori y to move thn person on . The 
order would specify the area to be avoided and the duration th order remains 
valid. If a suspect disobeys a lawful or1er to move on th office>r would 
then have the authority to bring e1e suspect to U1e police station . Th 
purpose is to remove pot ntial offend rs from the seen of anticipated crim's. 
'I11~ s uspect. is detained at ...tie station only as long as the order would have 
been valid in duration. An individual ordered to move on in violation of 
the crit ria built in to the statute could bring an action against the 
officer for the harrassment. 
In theory the substantive off nee is a refusal to obey a lawful ord r 
to move on , rather than an arrest on suspicion . The susp et receives fair 
noti ce from the officers order its:if - until h disobeys tha order he cannot 
be dA ained . 
While admittedly both proposals are a less severe inlervention on the 
freedom of a citizen and in all probability would be of short r dura ion than 
an arrest on s . 52 ( 1) ( j) the fundam nt.:al objection rem ins; t:h y ar an intrusion 
on he freedom of the individual on no more grounds than suspicion . Under the 
latter proposal , even if the suspect isn ' t detained and does obey the order 
to move on his freedom of mov ment and choice of where he can go ar restricted. 
He may well have to abandon some legitima act:ivity he had intended. 
88 . ote no e 18 supra 1358-136d 
89. Vol. 87 Yale Law Journal note 26 supra pp 603-626 
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Notwithstanding the intended safeguards against arbitrary enforcement one 
would expect such proposals would still be viewed by the police as legitimate 
crime prevention devices, open to widespread abuse and used to harass 
suspects. 
There is little doubt in the writer's mind, that the police themselves 
would not be over-enthusiastic about either of the two proposals. They are 
impractical and unsuited to a country like New Zealand wi~1 its relatively 
small cities by world standards. They are unnecessary to the extent that 
suspicious conduct is not really that widespread here, as perhaps the States. 
One would forecast that the police would find them cumbersome and unworkable, 
overtechnical, too time-consuming and beyond the scope of their present 
resource allocation capabilities. 
What other means of social control arc available th n to arrive at 
that element of crime prevention which is socially desirable; while at the 
same time avoiding , or minimising the formidable batt,ry of objections we 
have b een considering. If there are none we should no reject out of hand 
the alternative of doing nothing. 
In the writer's opinion there is one, however. The recurring theme 
of this article has been that the police, by informal m,ans of soci 1 
control, e.g. by deterring would be offenders by ~cir 1~1ysical pr sencc of 
by issuing warnings to a suspect that the police know "what they .. ire up to" 
achieve the same nds as an arr s t undc:>r S. ~2 ( 1) ( j) . 
The latter metriod, a"' we have seen . off nds m, ny of h tradition 1 
principl s of the criminal law and is an unwarrcnted in rfcrcnc: wi ·h th 
fi:eedom of the ir,dividual. It is a methocJ wh.;.._i, is r, r~ly used , nd is 
therefore questionable whether necessary. It should b scourged from the 
statute books. 
The former, however, is to my mind a proper and fair means of crime 
prevention, which pays due reverence to the time-honour d principl that a 
person cannot be arrested unless there is probable cause that a crime has 
been committed and he was the one who commit c:>d it. More importantly he 
freedom of the individual is left intact - ev n the suspect is fre , to 
choose whether to refrain from committing a crime or to go ahead and run the 
risk of being caught red-handed. Th rein lies th answer. 
'11r mr im1·r1mmrmn 
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